The idea of C/A codes GPS/GNSS Spoofing (Substitution), or the ability to mislead a satellite navigation receiver
into establishing a position or time fix which is incorrect, has been gaining attention as spoofing has become
more sophisticated. Various techniques have been proposed to detect if a receiver is being spoofed – with
varying degrees of success and computational complexity. If the jammer signals are sufficiently plausible then
the GNSS receiver may not realize it has been duped. There are various means of detecting spoofing activity
and hence providing effective mitigation methods. In this paper, a novel signal processing method applicable
to a single antenna handset receiver for spoofing detection has been described. Mathematical models and algorithms
have been developed to solve the problems of satellite navigation safety. What has been considered in
the paper is a spoofing detection algorithm based on the analysis of a civil satellite signal generated by mobile
C/A GPS/GNSS single-antenna receivers. The work has also served to refine the civilian spoofing threat assessment
by demonstrating the challenges involved in mounting a spoofing attack.
