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Browsing by Author Dobryakova, Larisa: 50 Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin

  • Dobryakova, Larisa; Lemieszewski, Łukasz; Ochin, Evgeny (Scientific Journals Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademia Morska w Szczecinie, )
    Spoofing, anti-spoofing, jamming and anti-jamming technologies have become an important research topic within the GNSS discipline. While many GNSS receivers leave a large space for signal dynamics, enough power space is left for the GNSS signals to be spoofed and/or jammed. The goal of spoofing is to provide the receiver with a misleading signal, fooling the receiver into using fake signals in the extra space for positioning calculations. The receiver will then generate a false position, thus misleading the navigator. The goal of jamming is to add noise to the satellite signal which leads to fooling the receiver into using “signals plus noise” for positioning calculations. This article discusses the approach to anti-jamming based on the shielding of antennas from the signal jammer.

Other publications

  • Pietrzykowski, Zbigniew; Borkowski, Piotr; Ochin, Evgeny; Dobryakova, Larisa (Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, 2012)
    The integration of seaports security subsystems aims at a development of the complex connection of local seaport security subsystems into a uniform overall security system. This requires the use of wire and wireless telecommunication infrastructure of the seaport territory, port basin and ships attributed to that port. These authors consider the application of cryptography and steganography in integration of seaports security subsystems
  • Ochin, Evgeny; Dobryakova, Larisa; Lemieszewski, Łukasz (Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, 2012)
    Many civil GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) applications need secure, assured information for asset tracking, fleet management and the like. But there is also a growing demand for geosecurity location- -based services. Unfortunately, GNSS is vulnerable to malicious intrusion and spoofing. How can users be sure that the information they receive is authentic? Spoofing is the transmission of matched-GNSS-signal- -structure interference in an attempt to commandeer the tracking loops of a victim receiver and thereby manipulate the receiver’s timing or navigation solution. A spoofer can transmit its counterfeit signals from a stand-off distance of several hundred meters, or it can be co-located with its victim. Spoofing attacks can be classified as simple, intermediate, or sophisticated in terms of their effectiveness and subtlety. In an intermediate spoofing attack, a spoofer synchronizes its counterfeit signals with the authentic GNSS signals, so they are code-phase-aligned at the target receiver. In this paper, authors consider the antispoofing algorithms based on finding statistical anomalies in the basic parameters of the satellite signals. At the stage of learning, the system of antispoofing explores the statistical properties of signals and at the phase of spoofing detection, the system used thresholds characteristics of statistical anomalies. The excess of the threshold characteristics provides a basis for probabilistic decision on the presence of spoofing
  • Gucma, Lucjan; Gucma, Maciej; Ochin, Evgeny; Dobryakova, Larisa (Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, 2012)
    The popularity of wireless technologies during the last decade has created a considerable expansion of wireless networks. Many researchers work now on the area of wireless resource planning and optimization. Optimization is considered as the main approach to designing and improving the performance of Wireless Local Area Networks Infrastructure of Seaports Security Systems. The presented models and algorithms enable flexible coverage planning and optimization of Wireless Network Infrastructure
  • Dobryakova, Larisa; Lemieszewski, Łukasz; Ochin, Evgeny (Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, 2013)
    The article discusses the new algorithms for detect of GNSS-spoofing based on a comparison of the pseudorange measurements results of navigation satellites and calculate the coordinates of a pair of GNSSreceivers in two modes: the normal GNSS-navigation and mode of the spoofing. The theoretical studies have shown that a single-antenna mode spoofing under certain conditions gives us the same measured pseudoranges. The calculated distance between the two antennas of GNSS-receivers gives us zero. In a mode of the normal GNSS-navigation computed distance between the antennas of the two GNSS-receivers exceeds the true distance to the tens of meters. These differences are used as the basic detection spoofing parameters.
  • Dobryakova, Larisa; Lemieszewski, Łukasz; Lusznikov, Eugeniusz; Ochin, Evgeny (Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, 2014)
    The article discusses a new approach to the detection of GNSS spoofing, based on the use of satellite compass. Comparing the results of measurements of GNSS receivers of compass in two modes (normal mode of GNSS navigation and spoofing mode). The studies have shown, that in mode of spoofing attacks in both receivers of satellite compass we have the equality of coordinates, which in algorithm coordinate definitions, determine mathematical indeterminate form 0/0. This means getting out of the operating status of the satellite compass that can be used as an alarm “spoofing attack” to take appropriate security measures of GNSS navigation.
  • Dobryakova, Larisa; Lemieszewski, Łukasz; Ochin, Evgeny (Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, 2014)
    Many civil GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) applications need secure, assured information for asset tracking, fleet management and the like. But there is also a growing demand for geosecurity locationbased services. Unfortunately, GNSS is vulnerable to malicious intrusion and spoofing. How can users be sure the information they receive is authentic? Spoofing is the transmission of matched-GNSS-signalstructure interference in an attempt to commandeer the tracking loops of a victim receiver and thereby manipulate the receiver’s timing or navigation solution. A spoofer can transmit its counterfeit signals from a stand-off distance of several hundred meters or it can be co-located with its victim. Spoofing attacks can be classified as simple, intermediate, or sophisticated in terms of their effectiveness and subtlety. In an intermediate spoofing attack, a spoofer synchronizes its counterfeit signals with the authentic GNSS signals so they are code-phase-aligned at the target receiver. In this paper we consider the anti-spoofing algorithms based on spoofing detection via Dual-Receiver.
  • Dobryakova, Larisa; Ochin, Evgeny (Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, 2014)
    Spoofing and antispoofing algorithms have become an important research topic within the GNSS discipline. The power of the GNSS signal on the earth’s surface averages –160 dBw. While many GNSS receivers leave large space for signal dynamics, enough power space is left for the GNSS signals to be spoofed. The goal of spoofing is to provide the receiver with a misleading signal, fooling the receiver to use fake signals in space for positioning calculations. The receiver will produce a misleading position solution. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the vulnerability of the satellite signal in repeater’s output from the viewpoint of GNSS spoofing attacks. The article discusses a new approach to GNSS spoofing, based on the application of GNSS signals repeating by potential terrorists. Practical spoofing that provides misleading navigation results at the receiver is difficult to conduct due to the signal infrastructure, and by applying trivial anti-spoofing algorithms in GPS receivers, spoofing attack can be easily detected. To detect spoofing attacks of this type we have a variety of methods. For example, the authors suggest the use of paired navigators and GNSS compasses as detectors of GNSS spoofing. Introduction Spoofing and antispoofing algorithms have become an important research topic within the GNSS discipline. There is an ever-increasing attention to safe and secure GNSS applications such as air, marine, and ground transportations, police and rescue services. The power of the GNSS signal on the earth’s surface averages –160 dBw. While, many GNSS receivers leave large space for the dynamics of the signal, enough power space is left for the GNSS signals to be spoofed. The goal of spoofing is to provide the receiver with a misleading signal, fooling the receiver to use fake signals in space for positioning calculations. The receiver will produce a misleading position solution. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the vulnerability of the satellite signal in repeater’s output from the viewpoint of GNSS spoofing attacks. The article discusses a new approach to GNSS spoofing, based on the application of GNSS signals repeating by potential terrorists. Practical spoofing
  • Dobryakova, Larisa; Ochin, Evgeny (Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, 2014)
    In computing, the Least Significant Bit (LSB) is the bit position in a binary integer giving the units value, that is, determining whether the number is even or odd. We do not use this format. In conventional Intel bit ordering, the Most Significant Bit (MSB) is numbered 7 and the least significant bit (LSB) is numbered 0: 27 (MSB) 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 (LSB) D = d7 d6 d5 d4 d3 d2 d1 d0 For example, if on the record of number D = 131 = 10000011 we invert the MSB = 1 into MSB = 0, then obtain D = 00000011 = 3, but if we invert LSB = 1 into LSB = 0, then distortions are considerably fewer: D = 10000010 = 130. It is common to assign each bit a position number, ranging from zero to N – 1, where N is the number of bits in the binary representation used. Normally, this is simply the exponent for the corresponding bit weight in base-2 (such as in 27, 26, …, 21, 20). In this article to reduce the stego-errors we use a pair of numbers D1 and D2 and a pair of corresponding LSB d1,0 and d2,0.
  • Ochin, Evgeny; Lemieszewski, Łukasz; Luszknikov, Eugeniusz; Dobryakova, Larisa (Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, 2013)
    Satellite navigation systems are widely used in navigation for precise trajectory determination of transport equipment. In this article mathematical models and algorithms have been developed to solve the problems of precision and safety of satellite navigation. One of the problems is spoofing (substitution) – a situation in which a system (hardware, software, etc.) successfully masquerades as another by falsifying data system and performs illegal actions. What is considered in the paper is spoofing detection algorithm based on the analysis of a civil satellite signal generated by the two receivers but instead a fully functional Spoofer GNSS signal repeater was used. This work is intended to equip GNSS users and receiver manufacturers with authentication methods that are effective against unsophisticated spoofing attacks. The work also serves to refine the civilian spoofing threat assessment by demonstrating the challenges involved in mounting a spoofing attack.
  • Dobryakova, Larisa; Lemieszewski, Łukasz; Ochin, Evgeny (Scientific Journals Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademia Morska w Szczecinie, )
    Spoofing, anti-spoofing, jamming, and anti-jamming algorithms have become an important research topic within the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) discipline. While many GNSS receivers leave large space for signal dynamics, enough power space is left for the GNSS signals to be spoofed. GNSS signal power on the earth’s surface is around 160 dBW. The goal of spoofing is to provide the receiver with a slightly more powerful misleading signal, stronger than the original GNSS signal, fooling the receiver into using fake signals for positioning calculations. The receiver will generate a misleading position of the navigator. Practical spoofing that provides misleading navigation results of the receiver is difficult to conduct due to the signal infrastructure. Using trivial anti-spoofing algorithms in GNSS receivers, spoofing attacks can be easily detected. The article discusses the vulnerability of unmanned vehicles and provides an approach to anti-spoofing based on measuring distance between two antennas.
  • Dobryakova, Larisa; Lemieszewski, Łukasz; Ochin, Evgeny (Scientific Journals Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademia Morska w Szczecinie, )
    Satellite navigation systems are commonly used to precisely determine the trajectory of transportation equipment. The widespread deployment of GNSS is pushing the current receiver technology to its limits due to the stringent demands for seamless, ubiquitous and secure/reliable positioning information. This fact is further aggravated by the advent of new applications where the miniaturized size, low power consumption and limited computational capabilities of user terminals pose serious risks to the implementation of even the most basic GNSS signal processing tasks. This paper has presented the advantage of Cloud-based GNSS Navigation, which facilitates the possibility of developing innovative applications where their particularities (e.g. massive processing of data, cooperation among users, security-related applications, etc.) make them suitable for implementation using Cloud-based infrastructure.

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